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The Linguistic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Shiro Ishikawa
Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University,
3-14-1 Hiyoshi, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-8522 Japan (E-Mail: ishikawa@math.keio.ac.jp)
About twenty years ago, we proposed the mathematical formulation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,
and further, we concluded that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and EPR-paradox are not contradictory.
This is true, however we now think that we should have argued about it under a certain firm interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Recently we proposed the linguistic quantum interpretation (called quantum and
classical measurement theory), which was characterized as a kind of metaphysical and linguistic turn of
the Copenhagen interpretation. This turn from physics to language does not only extend quantum theory
to classical systems but also yield the quantum mechanical world view (i.e., the philosophy of quantum
mechanics, in other words, quantum philosophy). In fact, we can consider that traditional philosophies have
progressed toward quantum philosophy. In this paper, we first review the linguistic quantum interpretation,
and further, clarify the relation between EPR-paradox and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. That is,
the linguistic interpretation says that EPR-paradox is closely related to the fact that syllogism does not
generally hold in quantum physics. This fact should be compared to the non-locality of Bell’s inequality.
1. Introduction
About twenty years ago ( in 1991), we proposed
and proved the mathematical formulation of Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle (cf. Theorem 2 and
Corollary 1 in ref. [1]). As mentioned in Section
4.6 (i.e., inequalities (8) and (9) ) later, note that
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle should not be
world
view
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relativity −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
quantum
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−−−−−−−−−−−→
realistic view
2©:dualism
−−−−−−−−−−−→
3©:linguistic turn
L© :
Plato
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(idealism)
4©
−−→
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Descartes
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5©
−−→
philosophy
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−−−−−−−−−−−→
7©:linguistic view
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everything
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

8©
−−→
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theory (=MT)
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Figure 1. Traditional philosophies from the quantum philosophical point of view (cf. Section 5)
confused with Robertson’s uncertainty principle [2].
And further, in the remark 3 of [1], we discussed
the relation between Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple and EPR-paradox [3], and concluded that the
two are not contradictory. This is true, but now we
consider that the argument in the remark 3 of [1] is
somewhat shallow. In order to clarify the relation
2EPR-paradox, we must start from the proposal of
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. That is
because even the Copenhagen interpretation is not
determined uniquely. This is our motivation to pro-
pose the linguistic interpretation of quantum me-
chanics [4, 5].
In this paper, adding new examples, we first re-
view the linguistic interpretation [4, 5], and explain
Figure 1. And lastly, we clarify the relation be-
tween EPR-paradox and Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle in the linguistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
2. Measurement Theory (Axioms )
2.1. Overview: Measurement theory
In this section, we shall explain the overview of mea-
surement theory (or in short, MT).
Measurement theory (refs. [4–11]) is, by an anal-
ogy of quantum mechanics (or, as a linguistic turn
of quantum mechanics ), constructed as the scien-
tific theory formulated in a certain C∗-algebra A
(i.e., a norm closed subalgebra in the operator al-
gebra B(H) composed of all bounded operators on
a Hilbert space H , cf. [12, 13] ). MT is composed
of two theories (i.e., pure measurement theory (or,
in short, PMT] and statistical measurement theory
(or, in short, SMT). That is, we see:
(A) MT (measurement theory)
= [measurement]
(Axiom 1)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2)
=


(A1) : [PMT ]
= [(pure) measurement]
(AxiomP 1)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2)
(A2) : [SMT ]
= [(statistical) measurement]
(AxiomS 1)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2)
where Axiom 2 is common in PMT and SMT. For
completeness, note that measurement theory (A)
(i.e., (A1) and (A2)) is a kind of language based
on “the quantum mechanical world view”. It may
be understandable to consider that
(B1) PMT and SMT is related to Fisher’s statistics
and Bayesian statistics respectively.
This is discussed in [6]. Thus, if we believe in Figure
1, we can answer to the following problem (cf. [6]):
(B2) What is statistics? Or, where is statistics in
science?
2.2. Mathematical preparations
In this paper, we mainly devote ourselves to the
C∗-algebraic formulation, and not the W ∗-algebraic
formulation (cf. the appendix in [4]). Thus, AxiomP
1 is often denoted by Axiom 1.
When A = Bc(H), the C∗-algebra composed of
all compact operators on a Hilbert space H , the (A)
is called quantum measurement theory (or, quan-
tum system theory), which can be regarded as the
linguistic aspect of quantum mechanics. Also, when
A is commutative
(
that is, when A is characterized
by C0(Ω), the C
∗-algebra composed of all continuous
complex-valued functions vanishing at infinity on a
locally compact Hausdorff space Ω (cf. [12])
)
, the
(A) is called classical measurement theory. Thus, we
have the following classification:
(C) MT


quantum MT (when A = Bc(H))
classical MT (when A = C0(Ω))
In this paper, we mainly devote ourselves to classical
MT (i.e., classical PMT and classical SMT).
Now we shall explain the measurement theory
(A). Let A(⊆ B(H)) be a C∗-algebra, and let A∗
be the dual Banach space of A. That is, A∗ =
{ρ | ρ is a continuous linear functional on A }, and
the norm ‖ρ‖A∗ is defined by sup{|ρ(F )| : F ∈
A such that ‖F‖A(= ‖F‖B(H)) ≤ 1}. The bi-linear
functional ρ(F ) is also denoted by A∗〈ρ, F 〉A, or
in short 〈ρ, F 〉. Define the mixed state ρ (∈ A∗)
such that ‖ρ‖A∗ = 1 and ρ(F ) ≥ 0 for all F ∈
A satisfying F ≥ 0. And put
S
m(A∗)={ρ ∈ A∗ | ρ is a mixed state}. (1)
A mixed state ρ(∈ Sm(A∗)) is called a pure state if
it satisfies that “ρ = θρ1+(1−θ)ρ2 for some ρ1, ρ2 ∈
S
m(A∗) and 0 < θ < 1” implies “ρ = ρ1 = ρ2”. Put
S
p(A∗)={ρ ∈ Sm(A∗) | ρ is a pure state}, (2)
which is called a state space. The Riesz theorem
(cf. [14]) says that C0(Ω)
∗ = M(Ω) = {ρ | ρ is a
signed measure on Ω }, Sm(C0(Ω)∗) = Mm+1(Ω) =
{ρ | ρ is a measure on Ω such that ρ(Ω) = 1 }.
Also, it is well known (cf. [12]) that Sp(Bc(H)
∗
) =
{|u〉〈u| (i.e., the Dirac notation) | ‖u‖H = 1},
and Sp(C0(Ω)
∗) =Mp+1(Ω) = {δω0 | δω0 is a point
measure at ω0 ∈ Ω}, where
∫
Ω f(ω)δω0(dω) = f(ω0)
3(∀f ∈ C0(Ω)). The latter implies that Sp(C0(Ω)
∗
)
can be also identified with Ω (called a spectrum space
or simply spectrum) such as
S
p(C0(Ω)
∗
)
(state space)
∋ δω ↔ ω ∈ Ω
(spectrum)
(3)
Here, assume that the C∗-algebra A(⊆ B(H)) is
unital, i.e., it has the identity I. This assumption is
not unnatural, since, if I /∈ A, it suffices to recon-
struct the A such that it includes A ∪ {I}. In this
sense, the C0(Ω) is often denoted by C(Ω).
According to the noted idea (cf. [15]) in quantum
mechanics, an observable O ≡(X,F , F ) in A is de-
fined as follows:
(D1) [Field] X is a set, F(⊆ 2X , the power set of X)
is a field of X , that is, “Ξ1,Ξ2 ∈ F ⇒ Ξ1∪Ξ2 ∈
F”, “Ξ ∈ F ⇒ X \ Ξ ∈ F”.
(D2) [Countably additivity] F is a mapping from F
to A satisfying: (a): for every Ξ ∈ F , F (Ξ) is a
non-negative element in A such that 0 ≤ F (Ξ)
≤ I, (b): F (∅) = 0 and F (X) = I, where 0
and I is the 0-element and the identity in A
respectively. (c): for any countable decomposi-
tion {Ξ1,Ξ2, . . .} of Ξ ∈ F (i.e., Ξk,Ξ ∈ F such
that
⋃∞
k=1 Ξk = Ξ, Ξi ∩Ξj = ∅(i 6= j)), it holds
that
lim
K→∞
ρ(F (
K⋃
k=1
Ξk)) = ρ(F (Ξ)) (∀ρ ∈ S
m(A∗))
(i.e., in the sense of weak convergence). (4)
Remark 1. By the Hopf extension theorem (cf.
[14]), we have the mathematical probability space
(X, F , ρm(F (·)) ) where F is the smallest σ-field
such that F ⊆ F . For the other formulation (i.e.,
W ∗-algebraic formulation ), see, for example, the
appendix in [4].
2.3. Pure measurement theory in (A1)
In what follows, we shall explain PMT in (A1).
With any system S, a C∗-algebra A(⊆ B(H))
can be associated in which the pure measurement
theory (A1) of that system can be formulated. A
state of the system S is represented by an element
ρ(∈ Sp(A∗)) and an observable is represented by
an observable O =(X,F , F ) in A. Also, the mea-
surement of the observable O for the system S with
the state ρ is denoted by MA(O, S[ρ])
(
or more pre-
cisely, MA(O :=(X,F , F ), S[ρ])
)
. An observer can
obtain a measured value x (∈ X) by the measure-
ment MA(O, S[ρ]).
The AxiomP 1 presented below is a kind of math-
ematical generalization of Born’s probabilistic inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. And thus, it is a
statement without reality.
AxiomP 1 [Pure Measurement]. The probability
that a measured value x (∈ X) obtained by the mea-
surement MA(O :=(X,F , F ), S[ρ0]) belongs to a set
Ξ(∈ F) is given by ρ0(F (Ξ)).
Next, we explain Axiom 2 in (A). Let (T,≤) be a
tree, i.e., a partial ordered set such that “t1 ≤ t3
and t2 ≤ t3” implies “t1 ≤ t2 or t2 ≤ t1”. In
this paper, we assume that T is finite. Assume
that there exists an element t0 ∈ T , called the
root of T , such that t0 ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ) holds. Put
T 2≤ = {(t1, t2) ∈ T
2 | t1 ≤ t2}. The family {Φt1,t2 :
At2 → At1}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ is called a causal relation (due
to the Heisenberg picture), if it satisfies the following
conditions (E1) and (E2).
(E1) With each t ∈ T , a C∗-algebra At is associated.
(E1) For every (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤, a Markov operator
Φt1,t2 : At2 → At1 is defined (i.e., Φt1,t2 ≥ 0,
Φt1,t2(IAt2 ) = IAt1 ). And it satisfies that
Φt1,t2Φt2,t3 = Φt1,t3 holds for any (t1, t2),
(t2, t3) ∈ T 2≤.
The family of dual operators {Φ∗t1,t2 : S
m(A∗t1) →
S
m(A∗t2)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ is called a dual causal rela-
tion (due to the Schro¨dinger picture). When Φ∗t1,t2
(Sp(A∗t1 )) ⊆ (S
p(A∗t2 )) holds for any (t1, t2) ∈ T
2
≤,
the causal relation is said to be deterministic.
Now Axiom 2 in the measurement theory (A) is
presented as follows:
Axiom 2 [Causality]. The causality is represented
by a causal relation {Φt1,t2 : At2 → At1}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ .
2.4. Statistical measurement theory in (A2)
We shall introduce the following notation: It is
usual to consider that we do not know the pure
state ρp0 (∈ S
p(A∗)) when we take a measure-
ment MA(O, S[ρp
0
]). That is because we usually take
a measurement MA(O, S[ρp
0
]) in order to know the
state ρp0. Thus, when we want to emphasize that we
do not know the state ρp0, MA(O, S[ρp0 ]) is denoted
by MA(O, S[∗]). Also, when we know the distribu-
tion ρm0 (∈ S
m(A∗)) of the unknown state ρp0, the
MA(O, S[ρp
0
]) is denoted by MA(O, S[∗]({ρ
m
0 })). The
ρm0 and MA(O, S[∗]({ρ
m
0 })) is respectively called a
mixed state and a statistical measurement.
4The AxiomS 1 presented below is a kind of math-
ematical generalization of AxiomP 1.
AxiomS 1 [Statistical measurement]. The prob-
ability that a measured value x (∈ X) obtained
by the statistical measurement MA(O ≡(X,F , F ),
S[∗]({ρ
m
0 })) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is given by
ρm0 (F (Ξ)) ( = A∗〈ρ
m
0 , F (Ξ)〉A ).
Here, Axiom 2 and Interpretation (H) mentioned
in the following section are common in (A1) and
(A2).
3. The Linguistic Interpretation
(Figure 1: 2©, 3©, 6©)
According to [4], we shall explain the linguistic in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics. The measure-
ment theory (A) asserts
(F) Obey Axioms 1 and 2. And, describe any ordi-
nary phenomenon according to Axioms 1 and 2
(in spite that Axioms 1 and 2 can not be tested
experimentally).
Still, most readers may be perplexed how to use Ax-
ioms 1 and 2 since there are various usages. Thus,
the following problem is significant.
(G) How should Axioms 1 and 2 be used?
Note that reality is not reliable since Axioms 1 and
2 are statements without reality.
Here, in spite of the linguistic turn (Figure 1: 3©)
and the mathematical generalization from B(H) to
a C∗-algebra A, we consider that the dualism (i.e.,
the spirit of so called Copenhagen interpretation)
of quantum mechanics is inherited to measurement
theory (Figure 1: 2©, or also, see (I) later ). Thus,
we present the following interpretation (H) [=(H1)–
(H3)]. That is, as the answer to the question (G),
we propose:
(H1) Consider the dualism composed of “observer”
and “system( =measuring object)”. And there-
fore, “observer” and “system” must be abso-
lutely separated.
(H2) Only one measurement is permitted. And thus,
the state after a measurement is meaningless
since it can not be measured any longer. Also,
the causality should be assumed only in the side
of system, however, a state never moves. Thus,
the Heisenberg picture should be adopted.
(H3) Also, the observer does not have the space-time.
Thus, the question: “When and where is a mea-
sured value obtained?” is out of measurement
theory,
and so on.
Although N. Bohr (i.e., the chief proponent of
the Copenhagen interpretation ) said, in the Bohr–
Einstein debates [3, 16], that the interpretation of
a physical theory has to rely on an experimental
practice. However, we consider that all confusion is
due to the preconception that the Copenhagen inter-
pretation is within physics. In this sense, we agree
with A. Einstein, who never accepted the Copen-
hagen interpretation as physics. That is, in spite of
Bohr’s realistic view, we propose the following lin-
guistic world view (Figure 1: 3©) :
(I) In the beginning was the language called mea-
surement theory (with the interpretation (H)).
And, for example, quantum mechanics can be
fortunately described in this language. And
moreover, almost all scientists have already
mastered this language partially and informally
since statistics (at least, its basic part) is char-
acterized as one of aspects of measurement the-
ory (cf. [4–11] ).
In this sense, we consider that measurement the-
ory holds as a kind of language-game (with the rule
(Axioms 1 and 2, Interpretation (H)), and therefore,
measurement theory is regarded as the axiomatiza-
tion (Figure 1: 6©) of the philosophy of language
(i.e., Saussure’s linguistic world view).
4. How to Use the Linguistic Interpre-
tation (H)
4.1. Parallel measurement, the law of large
numbers
For each k = 1, 2, ...,K, consider a measurement
MAk(Ok :=(Xk,Fk, Fk), S[ρk]). However, the in-
terpretation (H2) says that only one measurement
is permitted. Thus, we consider the spatial ten-
sor C∗-algebra ⊗Kk=1Ak(⊆ B(⊗
K
k=1Hk)), and con-
sider the product space ×Kk=1Xk and the product
field ⊠
K
k=1Fk, which is defined by the smallest field
that contains a family {×Kk=1Ξk | Ξk ∈ Fk, k =
1, 2, ...,K}. Define the parallel observable ⊗Kk=1Ok
= (×Kk=1Xk, ⊠
K
k=1Fk, F˜ ) in the tensor C
∗-algebra
⊗Kk=1Ak such that
F˜ (×Kk=1Ξk) = ⊗
K
k=1Fk(Ξk)
(∀Ξk ∈ Fk, k = 1, 2, ...,K).
Then, the above {MAk(Ok, S[ρk]) }
K
k=1 is represented
5by the parallel measurementM⊗K
k=1
Ak(⊗
K
k=1Ok,
S[⊗K
k=1
ρk]), which is also denoted by ⊗
K
k=1 MAk(Ok,
S[ρk]). Consider a particular case such that, A =
Ak, O = (X,F , F ) = (Xk,Fk, Fk), ρ = ρk
(∀k = 1, 2, ...,K). Let (x1, x2, ..., xK)(∈ XK) be a
measured value by the parallel measurement ⊗Kk=1
MA(O, S[ρ]). Then, using Axiom 1, we see the law
of large numbers, that is, for sufficiently large K,
ρ(F (Ξ)) ≈
♯[{k = 1, 2, ...,K | xk ∈ Ξ}]
K
(∀Ξ ∈ F)
holds, where ♯[A] is the the number of elements of
the set A. This is, of course, most fundamental in
science. Also, this is the reason that the term “prob-
ability” is used in Axiom 1.
4.2. Maximal likelihood estimation
Consider the classical cases (i.e., A = C0(Ω) ).
It may be usual to consider that Axiom 1 leads the
following statement, i.e., maximum likelihood esti-
mation in classical measurements:
(J) [Maximum likelihood estimation in classical
PMT]; When we know that a measured
value obtained by a measurement MC0(Ω)(O1
:=(X1,F1, F1), S[∗]) belongs to Ξ1(∈ F1),
there is a reason to infer that the unknown
state [∗]=δω0(∈ S
p(C0(Ω)
∗
) ≈ Ω, by (3))
where ω0(∈ Ω) is defined by [F1(Ξ1)](ω0) =
maxω∈Ω[F1(Ξ1)](ω) if it exists.
0
1
Ωω0
[F1(Ξ1)](ω)
Although this (J) is surely handy, note that the
(H2) says that it is illegal to regard the ρ0 as the
state after the measurementMC0(Ω)(O1, S[∗]). Thus,
strictly speaking, the (J) is informal.
By a similar method as the lead of the (J), we can
easily see the following statement (K), which should
be regarded as the measurement theoretical form of
maximum likelihood estimation (cf. [6], or Corollary
5.5 in [10]).
(K) [Maximum likelihood estimation in general
PMT]; When we know that a measured
value obtained by a measurement MA(
O :=(X1×X2,F1⊠F2, F ), S[∗]) belongs to Ξ1×
X2, there is a reason to infer that
the probability that the measured value belongs
to Ξ1×Ξ2 (∀Ξ2 ∈ F2) is given by the following
conditional probability:
ρ0(F (Ξ1 × Ξ2))
ρ0(F (Ξ1 ×X2))
(5)
where ρ0(∈ Sp(A∗)) is defined by ρ0(F (Ξ1 ×
X2)) = maxρ∈Sp(A∗) ρ(F (Ξ1 ×X2)) if it exists.
Here, note that the ρ0 is not the state after the
measurement MA( O, S[∗]).
This (K), which also includes quantum cases, is most
fundamental in statistics, and thus, we believe (cf.
[6,9]) that statistics is one of aspects of measurement
theory. If it be so, we can answer to the problem
(B2). For the relation between the informal (J) and
the formal (K), see Remark 2 later.
4.3. Simultaneous measurement
For each k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, consider a measurement
MA(Ok :=(Xk,Fk, Fk), S[ρ]). However, since the
(H2) says that only one measurement is permitted,
the measurements {MA(Ok, S[ρ])}
K
k=1 should be re-
considered in what follows. Under the commutativ-
ity condition such that
Fi(Ξi)Fj(Ξj) = Fj(Ξj)Fi(Ξi) (6)
(∀Ξi ∈ Fi, ∀Ξj ∈ Fj , i 6= j),
we can define the product observable ×Kk=1Ok =
(×Kk=1Xk, ⊠
K
k=1Fk, ×
K
k=1Fk) in A such that
(×Kk=1Fk)(×
K
k=1Ξk) = F1(Ξ1)F2(Ξ2) · · ·FK(ΞK)
(∀Ξk ∈ Fk, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K).
Here, ⊠Kk=1Fk is the smallest field including the fam-
ily {×Kk=1Ξk : Ξk ∈ Fk k = 1, 2, . . . ,K}. Then, the
above {MA(Ok, S[ρ])}
K
k=1 is, under the commutativ-
ity condition (6), represented by the simultaneous
measurement MA(×Kk=1Ok, S[ρ]).
Remark 2. [The relation between (J) and (K)]
Consider the (K) in the classical cases, i.e., A =
C0(Ω). And assume the simultaneous observable
F = F1×F2 in (5). Then, putting ρ0 = δω0 (i.e.,
the point measure at ω0), we see that
(5) =
[F1(Ξ1)× F2(Ξ2)](ω0)
[F1(Ξ1)× F2(X2)](ω0)
= [F2(Ξ2)](ω0)
=ρ0(F2(Ξ2)).
6Since this equality holds for any O2 = (X2,F2, F2)
and any Ξ2 ∈ F2, some may want to re-
gard the ρ0 as the state after the measurement
MC0(Ω)(O1 :=(X1,F1, F1), S[∗]) in the (J). Thus, in
spite of the (H2), the (J) may be allowed in classical
cases if the ρ0 may be regarded as something repre-
sented by the term such as “imaginary state”. This
is the meaning of the informal (J).
4.4. Sequential causal observable and its real-
ization
Consider a tree (T ≡{t0, t1, . . . , tn}, ≤) with the
root t0. This is also characterized by the map π :
T \ {t0} → T such that π(t) = max{s ∈ T | s < t}.
Let {Φt,t′ : At′ → At}(t,t′)∈T 2
≤
be a causal rela-
tion, which is also represented by {Φpi(t),t : At →
Api(t)}t∈T\{t0}. Let an observable Ot ≡(Xt,Ft, Ft)
in theAt be given for each t ∈ T . Note that Φpi(t),tOt
( ≡(Xt,Ft,Φpi(t),tFt) ) is an observable in the Api(t).
The pair [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt,t′ : At′ →
At}(t,t′)∈T 2
≤
] is called a sequential causal observable.
For each s ∈ T , put Ts = {t ∈ T | t ≥ s}. And de-
fine the observable Ôs ≡ (×t∈TsXt,⊠t∈TsFt, F̂s) in
As as follows:
Ôs =
{
Os (if s ∈ T \ π(T ) )
Os×(×t∈pi−1({s}) Φpi(t),tÔt) (if s ∈ π(T ))
(7)
if the commutativity condition holds (i.e., if the
product observable Os×(×t∈pi−1({s}) Φpi(t),t Ôt) ex-
ists) for each s ∈ π(T ). Using (7) iteratively, we can
finally obtain the observable Ôt0 in At0 . The Ôt0 is
called the realization (or, realized causal observable)
of [OT ].
Remark 3. [Kolmogorov extension theorem] In the
general cases such that countable additivity and in-
finite T are required, the existence of the above Ôt0
is, by using the Kolmogorov extension theorem in
probability theory [17], proved in the W ∗-algebraic
formulation (cf. [10]). We think that this fact is
evidence that the interpretation (H2) is hidden be-
hind the utility of the Kolmogorov extension theo-
rem. Recall the following well-known statement that
always appears in the beginning of probability the-
ory:
(L) Let (X,F , P ) be a probability space. Then, the
probability that an event Ξ(∈ F) occurs is given
by P (Ξ),
which, as well as Axiom 1, is a statement without
reality. We consider that the Kolmogorov exten-
sion theorem is regarded as one of the finest answers
to the problem: “How should the statement (L) be
used?”. That is, in mathematical probability theory,
the answer is presented as the form of a basic theo-
rem (i.e., the Kolmogorov extension theorem). On
the other hand, in measurement theory, the problem
(G) is answered by the interpretation (H).
Remark 4. [Wavefunction collapse] Again recon-
sider the (K) in the simplest case that T =
{t0, t1}, π(t1) = t0. Taking a measurement
MAt0
(Ot0 , S[ρ0]), we know that the measured value
belongs to Ξ0 (∈ Ft0). Then, it may be usual to con-
sider that a certain wavefunction collapse happens
by the measurement, that is, Sp(A∗t0) ∋ ρ0 7→ ρ
Ξ0
0 ∈
S
p(A∗t0). And continuously, we take a measurement
MAt0
(Φt0,t1Ot1 , S[ρΞ0
0
]
). Here, the probability that
a measured value belongs to Ξ1 (∈ Ft1) is, by Ax-
iom 1, given by ρΞ00 (Φt0,t1F1(Ξ1)). However, this
ρ
Ξ0
0 (Φt0,t1F1(Ξ1)) must be equal to the conditional
probability
ρ0(F̂ (Ξ0 × Ξ1))
ρ0(F̂ (Ξ0 ×X1))
if the commutativity condition holds (i.e., the si-
multaneous observable Ôt0 = Ot0 × Φt0,t1Ot1 =
(Xt0×Xt1 ,Ft0 ⊠ Ft1 , F̂ :=Ft0×Φt0,t1Ft1) exists).
This implies that it suffices to consider only the mea-
surement MAt0 (Ot0×Φt0,t1Ot1 , S[ρ0]). That is, two
measurements MAt0 (Ot0 , S[ρ0 ]
) and MAt0 (Φt0,t1Ot1 ,
S
[ρ
Ξ0
0
]
) are not needed. Also, if the commutativity
condition is ignored in the argument of the wave-
function collapse, it is doubtful.
4.5. Bayes’ method in classical SMT
Let O1 ≡ (X,F , F ) be an observable in a commu-
tative C∗-algebra C(Ω). And let O2 ≡ (Y,G, G) be
any observable in C(Ω). Consider the product ob-
servable O1 ×O2 ≡ (X × Y,F ⊠ G, F ×G) in C(Ω).
Assume that we know that the measured value
(x, y) obtained by a simultaneous measurement
MC(Ω)(O1 × O2, S[∗]({ν0})) belongs to Ξ × Y (∈
F ⊠ G). Then, by AxiomS 1, we can infer that
(M1) the probability PΞ(G(Γ)) that y belongs to Γ(∈
G) is given by
PΞ(G(Γ)) =
∫
Ω[F (Ξ)G(Γ)](ω) ν0(dω)∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω) ν0(dω)
(∀Γ ∈ G).
7Thus, we can assert that:
(M2) [Bayes’ method, cf. [6,9]]. When we know that
a measured value obtained by a measurement
MC(Ω)(O1 ≡ (X,F , F ), S[∗]({ν0})) belongs to
Ξ, there is a reason to infer that the mixed
state after the measurement is equal to νa0 (∈
Mm+1(Ω)), where
νa0 (D) =
∫
D
[F (Ξ)](ω) ν0(dω)∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω) ν0(dω)
(∀D ∈ BΩ).
This (as well as (J)) is, of course, informal.
4.6. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
In this section, we use the W ∗-algebraic for-
mulation, that is, we consider the basic structure
[Bc(H), B(H)]B(H) (cf. Section 5.5 later). Let
A1 and A2 be self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert
space H . Note that the spectral representation
Ok = (R,BR, EAk) of Ak is regarded as the observ-
able in B(H). Thus, we have two measurements
MB(H)(Ok, S[ρu]) (ρu = |u〉〈u| ∈ S
p(Bc(H)
∗), k =
1, 2). However, since O1 and O2 do not generally
commute, Interpretation (H2) says that it is impossi-
ble to measure MB(H)(O1, S[ρ]) and MB(H)(O2, S[ρ])
simultaneously. Then we consider another Hilbert
space K, ρs = |s〉〈s| ∈ Sp(Bc(K)∗), self-adjoint op-
erators Âk on a tensor Hilbert space H ⊗ K such
that
(N1) : 〈v,Akv〉H = 〈v ⊗ s, Âkv ⊗ s〉H⊗K (∀v ∈ H)
(N2) : Â1 and Â2 commute
The existence is assured (cf. Theorem 1 in [1]). De-
fine the observable Ôk = (R,BR, EÂk) in B(H ⊗K)
by the spectral representation of Âk. By the com-
mutativity (N2), we get the product observable
Ô1 × Ô2, which is called the approximately si-
multaneous observable of A1 and A2. Thus we
can take an approximately simultaneous measure-
ment MB(H⊗K)(Ô1 × Ô2, S[ρu⊗ρs]) of A1 and A2.
Putting∆k = ||(Âk −Ak ⊗ I)(u ⊗ s)||H⊗K , we have
the following Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (cf.
Theorem 2 in [1]):
∆1 ·∆2 ≥
1
2
|〈A1u,A2u〉H − 〈A2u,A1u〉H | (∀u ∈ H)
(8)
This should not be confused with Robertson’s un-
certainty principle [2], which says
σ1 · σ2 ≥
1
2
|〈A1u,A2u〉H − 〈A2u,A1u〉H | (∀u ∈ H)
(9)
where σk is defined by ||(Ak − 〈u,Aku〉)u||H .
5. Traditional Philosophies (Figure 1)
According to [5], we shall explain Figure 1:[ 1©-
8©] from the measurement theoretical point of view
in what follows..
5.1. Realistic world view and Linguistic world
view
Figure 1 says that the realistic world view R© and
the linguistic world view L© exist together in science.
Some may ask:
(O) Why is the series L© (or, idealism originated by
Plato) underestimated in science?
We think that the reason is due to the fact that the
L© is lacking in the axiomatization 6© if we do not
have measurement theory. That is, we believe that
there is no scientific world view without axiomatiza-
tion.
5.2. Dualism
Interpretation (H1) says “Image Figure 2 when-
ever measurement theory is used”.
•
observer
(I(=mind))
system
(matter)
✛
✲
observable
measured
value
a©interfere
b©perceive a reaction
state
Figure 2. Descartes’ figure in MT
where the interaction [ a© and b©] must not be em-
phasized, that is, it must be implicit. That is be-
cause, if it is explicitly stated, the dualism (H1) is
violated.
John Locke’s famous sayings “primary quality
(e.g., length, weight, etc.)” and “secondary quality
8(e.g., sweet, dark, cold, etc.)” urge us to associate
the following correspondence:
state↔primary quality, observable↔secondquality
Also, it may be understandable to regard “observ-
able” as “measurement instrument” or “sensory sys-
tem”, for example, eyes, glasses, condensation trail,
etc. And further, it is natural to consider that there
is no measured value without observer’s brain (i.e.,
when something reaches observer’s brain, it becomes
a measured value). Thus, we want to consider the
following correspondence in Table 1.
Table 1: Descartes vs. MT
Descartes mind (brain) body matter
MT measured value observable state
In the history of philosophy, two kinds of dualisms
( based on “mind-body dualism” and “matter-mind
dualism” ) may be frequently discussed. However, it
should be noted that the dualism (H1) is composed
of three concepts as mentioned in Table 1. Also,
the following question is nonsense in the linguistic
world view.
(P1) What is “measured value” ( or, observable,
state)? Or equivalently, in the sense of Table
1, what is “mind” ( or, body, matter)? And
moreover, what is “probability” (or, causality)?
Therefore, we must admit that the correspondence
in Table 1 is rather figurative, that is, it is not
worth discussing the problem (P1) seriously in the
linguistic world view. From the great history of phi-
losophy, we learned that the serious consideration
(i.e., the consideration from the realistic world view)
of the problem (P1) (e.g., mind-body problem, etc.)
always led us into blind alleys.
We have to confirm that we are now in the side
of the linguistic world view (i.e., after the linguis-
tic turn 3© in Figure 1) and not the realistic world
view. Thus, our interest always focuses on the prob-
lem:
(P2) How should the term: “measured value” (or.
observable, state ) be used? And moreover,
How should “probability” (or, causality) be de-
scribed?
We, of course, assert that this answer is just given
by measurement theory (i.e., Axioms 1 and 2, Inter-
pretation (H)). After accepting measurement theory,
what we can do in measurement theory is only to
trust in man’s linguistic competence. This is our
linguistic world view (I).
Here, we want to consider that the following two
are essentially the same:
(Q1) To be is to be perceived (by Berkeley)
(Q2) There is no science without measurement (par-
ticularly, measured value).
Also, in the sense of Table 1, these are similar to
(Q3) There is no science without human’s brain,
which may be also similar to Kant’s assertion (see
Section 5.7 later).
5.3. I think, therefore I am.
Figure 2 (Descartes’ figure in MT) may be in-
spired from the Descartes primary principle:
(R) I think, therefore I am.
However, it should be noted that the statement (R)
is not a statement in the dualism of Interpretation
(H1). That is because it is natural to assume that
“I”=“observer” and “I”=“system” in the (R), which
clearly contradicts the (H1). We may see an irony in
the fact that the non-dualistic statement (R) gives
foundations to the dualistic Figure 2. However, it
is sure that the establishment of “I” in (R) brought
us modern science (Figure 1: 4©).
Also, it is natural to consider that Heidegger’s say-
ing: “In-der-Welt-sein” is out of Figure 2, and thus,
out of measure theory. If some succeed the axioma-
tization of “In-der-Welt-sein”, it will be the powerful
rival of measurement theory in science.
5.4. Causality and Probability
The following paradigm shift (cf. Figure 1: 1© ):
(the middle ages)
purpose
(Aristotle)
1©
−−−−−−−−−→
paradigm shift
(the modern ages)
causality
(Bacon, Newton, Hume)
is the greatest paradigm shift throughout all history
of science. However, it should be noted that there
are several ideas for “causality”. For example New-
ton’s causality is realistic, and Hume’s causality is
subjective. On the other hand, our causality (i.e.,
Axiom 2) is linguistic.
Although some philosophers (e.g., K. Popper [19])
consider that the discovery of “probability” is as
9great as that of “causality”, it is sure that the former
is underestimated in science, The reason of the un-
derestimation may be due to the fact that the “prob-
ability” is never presented in a certain world view
(but in mathematics (cf. [17]), on the other hand,
the “causality” is established in the world view (i.e.,
Newtonian mechanics). We think that it is desirable
to understand the two concepts (i.e., “probability”
and “causality”) in the same world view. It should
be noted that this is realized in Axioms 1 and 2 of
measurement theory.
5.5. Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Space-
Time Problem)
In this section, first we must prepare the term
“spectrum” in the formula (3). Consider the pair
[A,A]B(H), called a basic structure (cf. Appendix
in [4]). Here, A(⊆ B(H)) is a C∗-algebra, and
A (A ⊆ A ⊆ B(H)) is a particular C∗-algebra
(called a W ∗-algebra) such that A is the weak clo-
sure of A in B(H). Let AS (⊆ A) be the com-
mutative C∗-subalgebra. Note that AS is repre-
sented such that AS = C0(ΩS) for some locally
compact Hausdorff space ΩS (cf. [12]). The ΩS is
called a spectrum. For example, consider one parti-
cle quantum system, formulated in a basic struc-
ture [Bc(L
2(R3)), B(L2(R3))]B(L2(R3)). Then, we
can choose the commutative C∗-algebra C0(R
3) (⊂
B(L2(R3)), and thus, we get the spectrum R3. This
simple example will make us proposal (S2) later.
In Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1715–1716),
they (i.e., Leibniz and Clarke(=Newton’s friend) )
discussed “space-time problem”. Their ideas are
summarized as follows:
(S1)


R©: Newton, Clarke
(realistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in physics)
realistic space-time
L©: Leibniz
(linguistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in language)
linguistic space-time
That is, Newton considered “What is space-time?”.
On the other hand, Leibniz considered “How should
space-time be represented?”, though he did not pro-
pose his language. Measurement theory is in Leib-
niz’s side, and asserts that
(S2) Space should be described as a kind of spec-
trum. And time should be described as a kind
of tree. In other words, time is represented by
a parameter t in a linear ordered tree T .
Therefore, we think that the Leibniz-Clarke de-
bates should be essentially regarded as “the linguis-
tic world view L©” vs. “the realistic world view R©”.
Hence, the statement (S2) should be added to Inter-
pretation (H) as sub-interpretation of measurement
theory.
5.6. Observer’s time
It is usual to consider that quantum mechanics
and observer’s time are incompatible. This leads In-
terpretation (H3), which says that observer’s time is
nonsense in measurement theory. That is, there is
no tense — past, present, future — in measurement
theory, and therefore, in science. Many philosophers
(e.g., Augustinus, Bergson, Heidegger, etc.) tried to
understand observer’s time. However, from the sci-
entific point of view, their attempts may be reckless.
From the measurement theoretical point of view, we
feel sympathy for J. McTaggart, whose paradox [18]
suggests that observer’s time leads science to incon-
sistency.
5.7. Linguistic turn (Figure 1: 3©, 5©)
For the question “Which came first, the world
or the language?”, two answers (the realistic world
view and the linguistic world view) are possible.
However, as mentioned in the (I), measurement the-
ory is in the side of “the language came first” (due
to Saussure, Wittgenstein, etc,).
Note that two kinds of linguistic turns (i.e., 3© and
5©) are asserted in Figure 1. That is, reprinting the
corresponding part of Figure 1, we see:
quantum
mechanics
(physics)
3©:linguistic
yturn
Kant
(idealism)
5©:linguistic
−−−−−−−−→
turn
philosophy
of language
(linguistic view)
6©:axiom
−−−−−−→ MT
(language)
where 3© is the turn from physics to language, and 5©
is the turn from “brain” to language. Also, note that
the linguistic world view (I) is essentially the same
as the following Wittgenstein’s famous statement:
(T1) The limits of my language mean the limits of
my world.
In fact, Schro¨dinger’s cat (or, the theory of relativ-
ity) is out of the world described by measurement
10
theory. And moreover, the assertion (F) is similar
to Kant’s main assertion (“synthetic a priori judge-
ment”) in his famous book “Critique of Pure Rea-
son [20]”, that is, the two are similar in the sense of
no experimental validation. Therefore, we want to
consider the following correspondence:
(T2) [MT]
(Axioms 1 and 2)
↔ [Critique of Pure Reason]
(synthetic a priori judgement )
However, as mentioned in (Q3), Kant’s epistemolog-
ical approach (i.e., Copernican turn) is rather psy-
chological and not linguistic, in spite that his pur-
pose is philosophy (i.e., the world view) and not psy-
chology (or, brain science).
We (as well as most scientists) consider:
(T3) There is no boundary between ”mind” and
”matter”.
However, this fact should not be confused with our
assertion (F), that is,
(T4) Most science should be described by measure-
ment theory (i.e., the language based on dual-
ism (= Figure 1 ) ).
If there is the confusion between (T3) and (T4), this
is due to the misreading of [20].
5.8. There are no facts, only interpretations
Nietzsche’s famous saying “There are no facts,
only interpretations” is effective in measurement
theory. This is shown in this section.
Let testees drink water with various temperature
ω ◦C(0 ≦ ω ≦ 100). And you ask them “cold” or
“hot” alternatively. Gather the data, ( for example,
gc(ω) persons say “cold”, gh(ω) persons say “hot”)
and normalize them, that is, get the polygonal lines
such that
fc(ω) =
gc(ω)
the numbers of testees
fh(ω) =
gh(ω)
the numbers of testees
And
fc(ω) =


1 (0 ≦ ω ≦ 10)
70−ω
60 (10 ≦ ω ≦ 70)
0 (70 ≦ ω ≦ 100)
,
fh(ω) = 1− fc(ω)
Therefore, for example,
(U1) You choose one person from the testees, and
you ask him/her “cold” or “hot” alterna-
tively. Then the probability that he/she says[
“cold”“hot”
]
is given by
[
fc(55) = 0.25
fh(55) = 0.75
]
This is described in terms of Axiom 1 in what fol-
lows. Consider the state space Mp+1(Ω) (≈ Ω =
interval [0, 100](⊂ R) ) and measured value space
X = {c, h}. Then, we have the (temperature) ob-
servable Och = (X, 2
X , Fch) in C(Ω) such that
[Fch(∅)](ω) = 0, [Fch(X)](ω) = 1
[Fch({c})](ω) = fc(ω), [Fch({h})](ω) = fh(ω)
Thus, we get a measurement MC(Ω)(Och, S[δω]).
Therefore, for example, putting ω=55 ◦C, we can, by
Axiom 1, represent the statement (U1) as follows.
(U2) the probability that a measured value
x(∈ X={c, h}) obtained by measurement
MC(Ω)(Och, S[δ55]) belongs to set


∅
{c}
{h}
{c, h}

 is
given by


[Fch(∅)](55) = 0
[Fch({c})](55) = 0.25
[Fch({h})](55) = 0.75
[Fch({c, h})](55) = 1


For example, assume that ω = 5 ∈ Ω(= [0, 100]).
Then, we see, by Axiom 1, that
(U3) the probability that a measured value x(∈
X={c, h}) obtained by the measurement
MC(Ω)(Och, S[δ5]) belongs to set


∅
{c}
{h}
{c, h}

 is
given by


[Fch(∅)](5) = 0
[Fch({c})](5) = 1
[Fch({h})](5) = 0
[Fch({c, h})](55) = 1


That is,
(U4) a measured value x(∈ X={c, h}) obtained by
measurement MC(Ω)(Och, S[δ5]) is surely equal
to “c”.
Here, we must not consider the following causality:
(U5) 5
◦C
(cause)
−−−−−−−→
(causality)
cold
(result)
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The (U4) is not related to causality but measure-
ment. That is because Axiom 2 (causality) is not
used in (U4). Recall that
(U6) Interpretation (H3) says that causality belongs
to the side of system (and not between observer
and system).
Thus, the (U5) is not proper in the above situation.
However, there is another idea as follows.
That is, consider the dual causal operator Φ∗ :
Mp+1([0, 100])→M
m
+1({c, h}) such that
[Φ∗δω](D) = fc(ω) · δc(D) + fh(ω) · δh(D)
(∀ω ∈ [0, 100], ∀D ⊆ {c, h})
Then, the above (U5) can be regarded as the
causality. Considering the exact observable O(exa)
( = ({c, h}, 2{c,h}, Fexa) ) in C({c, h}) (where
[Fexa(Ξ)](ω) = 1 (ω ∈ Ξ), = 0 (ω /∈ Ξ)), we see
that Och = ΦO
(exa), and thus, we get the measure-
ment MC(Ω)(ΦO
(exa), S[δ5]). In this case, the above
(U5) is regarded as the causality. In this sense, the
(U5) is proper.
In the above argument, readers may be reminded
of Nietzsche’s famous saying:
(U7) There are no facts, only interpretations.
Also, note that “the measurement of a measure-
ment” is meaningless in measurement theory.
5.9. Parmenides and Zeno
About 2500 years ago, Parmenides said that
(V1) There are no “plurality”, but only “one”. And
therefore, there is no movement.
We want to regard this (V1) as the origin of In-
terpretation (H2) (i.e., “Only one measurement is
permitted. And therefore, a state never moves.”).
Zeno, the student of Parmenides, proposed sev-
eral paradoxes concerning movement. The following
“Achilles and the tortoise” is most famous.
[Achilles and the tortoise] In a race, the quickest
runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pur-
suer must first reach the point whence the pursued
started, so that the slower must always hold a lead.
Beginners of philosophy may have a question:
(V2) Why have philosophers investigated such an
easy problems during 2500 years?
However, it should be noted that “Achilles and the
tortoise” is not an elementary mathematical prob-
lem concerning geometric series. Since Parmenides
and Zeno were philosophers, it is natural to con-
sider that Zeno’s paradoxes should be regarded as
the problem concerning world view. That is, we be-
lieve that Zeno’s question is as follows:
(W) In what kind of world view (in Figure 1) should
Zeno’s paradoxes be understood? And further,
if the proper world view is not in Figure 1, pro-
pose the new world view in which Zeno’s para-
doxes can be discussed!
It is clear that Zeno’s paradoxes are not in physics,
and thus, Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechan-
ics and the theory of relativity and so on are not
proper for the answer to the problem (W). We as-
sert that classical measurement theory is the proper
world view, in which Zeno’s paradoxes are described.
The classical measurement theoretical description of
Zeno’s paradoxes is easy, in fact, it was simply shown
in [11].
Readers may be interested in the unnatural situ-
ation such that “Achilles” and “tortoise” are quan-
tum particles (i.e., Zeno’s paradoxes in quantum me-
chanics). However we have no clear answer to this
problem though our paper [21] may be helpful. Also,
for the more unnatural situation (i.e., Zeno’s para-
doxes in the theory of relativity), see [22].
It is interesting and strange to see that we already
have the world description methods (i.e., Newtonian
mechanics, quantum mechanics and the theory of
relativity) for the unnatural situations, but, we have
no world description method for the natural situa-
tion if we do not know measurement theory. Thus, if
we believe in Figure 1, we are able to be convinced
that Zeno’s paradoxes are solved.
5.10. Syllogism
As an example of syllogism, the following example
(due to Aristotle) is famous.
(X1) Since Socrates is a man and all men are mortal,
it follows that Socrates is mortal.
However, it should be noted that there is a great gap
between the (X1) and the following mathematical
syllogism:
(X2) A⇒ B, B ⇒ C, then, it follows that A⇒ C.
That is because the (X2) is merely mathematical
rule and not the world view, and therefore, it is not
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guaranteed that the rule (X2) is applicable to the
world (X1). In fact, as mentioned in ref. [5], the
(X1) does not hold in quantum cases.
Now, we are in the same situation such as (W).
That is, we have a similar question (i.e., (W) ≈ (W’)
):
(W’) In what kind of world view (in Figure 1) should
the phenomenon (X1) be described? And fur-
ther, if the proper world view is not in Figure
1, propose the new world view!
We assert that classical measurement theory is the
proper world view. In fact, in [7], the phenomenon
(X1) is described as a theorem in classical measure-
ment theory.
6. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle,
EPR-Paradox and Syllogism
It is a matter of course that any argument con-
cerning EPR-paradox is not clear unless the inter-
pretation is declared before the argument. In this
sense, we believe that A. Einstein wanted to say
in [3]:
(Y) By a hint of EPR-paradox, propose a new quan-
tum interpretation!
Now we have the linguistic interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, and thus, we can expect to clarify
EPR-paradox.
As shown and emphasized in [5], quantum syl-
logism does not generally hold. We believe that
this fact was, for the first time, discovered in EPR-
paradox [3]. The reason that we think so is as fol-
lows.
Consider the two-particles system composed of
particles P1 and P2, which is formulated in a Hilbert
space L2(R2). Let ρs(∈ Sp(Bc(L2(R2))) be the
EPR-state in EPR-paradox (or, the singlet state in
Bohm’s situation). Here, consider as follows:
(Z1) Assume that (x1, p2) and p
′
2 are obtained by the
simultaneous measurement of [ the position of
P1, the momentum of P2] and [the momentum
of P2]. Since it is clear that p2 = p
′
2, thus, we
see that
(x1, p2)
[the position of P1, the momentum of P2] )
=⇒
p2
[the momentum of P2]
Here, for the definition of “=⇒”, see ref. [5], or more
precisely, [7].
(Z2) Assume that p1 and p2 are obtained by the si-
multaneous measurement of [the momentum of
P1] and [the momentum of P2]. Since the state
ρs(∈ Sp(Bc(L2(R2))) is the EPR-state, we see
that p1 = −p2, that is, we see that
p2
[ the momentum of P2 ]
=⇒ −p2
[the momentum of P1]
(Z3) Therefore, if quantum syllogism holds, (Z1) and
(Z2) imply that
−p2
[the momentum of P1]
that is, the momentum of P1 is equal to −p2.
Since the above (Z1)- (Z3) is not the approximately
simultaneous measurement (cf. the definition (N)),
it is not related to Heisenberg’s uncertainty princi-
ple (8). Thus, the conclusion (Z3) is not contradic-
tory to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (8). This
was asserted in the remark 3 of ref. [1]. However,
now we can say that the conclusion (Z3) is not true.
That is because the interpretation (H2) (i.e., only
one measurement is permitted) says, as seen in [5],
that quantum syllogism does not hold by the non-
commutativity of the above three observables, i.e.,

[the position of P1, the momentum of P2]
[the momentum of P2]
[the momentum of P1]
Thus we see that EPR-paradox is closely related to
the fact that quantum syllogism does not hold in
general. This should be compared with Bell’s in-
equality [4, 23], which is believed to be closely con-
nected to “non-locality”.
7. Conclusions
As mentioned in [4–11], measurement theory ( in-
cluding several conventional system theories, e.g.,
statistics, dynamical system theory, quantum sys-
tem theory, etc.) is one of the most useful theories
in science. Following the well-known proverb: “A
sound mind in a sound body”, we consider: “A good
philosophy in a very useful theory.” For example,
“A good realistic philosophy in the theory of rela-
tivity” is clearly sure. Therefore, we believe that a
good philosophy has to be hidden behind measure-
ment theory. This belief makes us write this paper.
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That is, we want to assert “A good linguistic philos-
ophy in quantum mechanics”.
Dr. Hawking said in his best seller book [24]:
Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so
much that Wittgenstein the most famous philosopher
this century, said “The sole remaining task for phi-
losophy is the analysis of language.” What a come-
down from the great tradition of philosophy from
Aristotle to Kant! We think that this is not
only his opinion but also most scientists’ opinion.
And moreover, we mostly agree with him. However,
we believe that it is worth reconsidering the series
L© (i.e., the linguistic world view) in Figure 1. In
spite of Lord Kelvin’s saying: “Mathematics is the
only good metaphysics”, we assert that measurement
theory is also good scientific metaphysics. In order
to answer the problem (B2) (or, Zeno’s paradoxes
and so on), we believe that measurement theory is
indispensable for science.
In this paper, we see, in the linguistic interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, that EPR-paradox
is closely related to the fact that quantum syllo-
gism does not hold in general. If we can believe
that Bell’s inequality is related to “non-locality”, we
can clearly understand the difference between EPR-
paradox and Bell’s inequality.
We hope that our proposal will be examined from
various view points.
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